The aim of this article is to analyze the question of career interruptions and to evaluate their impact on pension retirement for French private sector workers. Using the last French survey on households ' wealth (2003-2004), we first study the career setbacks for individuals born between 1938 and 1948. We highlight the new trends in professional paths. The risk of unemployment and job flexibility has sharply risen. As a consequence, some cohorts appear to be more exposed to career interruptions. Second, we determine how pension rights for French employees are affected by different career accidents. We consider unemployment, part-time employment and inactivity periods. Our results show how, by compensating for some career accidents, the French legislation allows individuals to receive, in some cases, the same level of pension that they would have received with a smooth professional path. JEL: E24, H55, J26
Introduction
The retirement age and the standard of living of pensioners depend on a variety of individual and familial life routes: age of employment entry, children, life expectancy, unemployment, inactivity... These deviations from a continuous career are more frequent than in the past in most OECD countries and could induce a strong impact on the age of retirement and on pension benefits (COR, 2007) . The aim of this article is to evaluate the effects of several cases of career breaks on the retirement pension for French workers.
The literature dealing with this subject highlights the specific situation of women. A lot of studies provide an analysis of women's career interruptions due to childbirth. Arun et alii. Nakamura and Ueda (1999) investigate the determinants of career interruption following childbirth for married women in Japan. Their results show the difficulty for an educated woman to find an equivalent position when she quits her job due to childbirth. From Danish data, Gupta and Smith (2001) assess the negative impact of children on mothers' human capital accumulation. In most cases, the number of children has a negative effect on women's wages and consequently on women's pensions.
While children affect particularly women's careers, others career break determinants could be identified. The literature on the French case (Briard, 2007; Cloarec, 2000; Colin, Iéhlé, and Mahieu, 2000; Caussat, 1996) shows that many individuals are now affected by several breaks during their professional trajectory due to unemployment, early retirement, part-time work, or inactivity.
Little research has been done to estimate the impact of these interruptions on pension benefits.
We provide an analysis of the consequences of career accidents on pension retirement in the case of French employees. Their situations are quite relevant because, firstly, the last pension reform (2003) has introduced new rules on pension rights. Secondly, in France, workers acquire pension rights in some cases of career interruptions. Indeed, French legislation allows compensation of unemployment, illness or invalidity periods in terms of duration, but the amount of pension is often calculated from a smaller reference wage. Inactivity could be also compensated by allowing insurance periods but only in the case of children's education.
This article distinguishes two sets of analysis. On the one hand, this paper investigates the recent evolution of career accidents from microdata provided by a French survey (Enquête Patrimoine, Insee, 2003 Insee, -2004 . Our results indicate that workers and pensioners are experiencing very different economic situations. These disparities are strengthened by taking into account the generation, the gender or the socio-economic group. On the other hand, this paper investigates the impact of different career accidents (unemployment, part-time work...) on pensions by considering the last pension reform's rules (2003) .
The plan of the article is as follows. Section 2 provides a survey of the recent literature on the evolution of the French professional trajectories. Section 3 describes the methodology of career reconstruction and presents career path analysis. Section 4 assesses the impact of career accidents on pension. A final section concludes.
A brief literature review
The recent literature on career interruptions indicates that smooth careers are not frequent.
This phenomenon is particularly observed in France over the last years. Many French studies have devoted their attention to these increasing career breaks (Cloarec, By using the same survey, Burricand and Roth (2000) pointed towards the crucial role of French legislation, notably, the possibility for workers in the private sector to retire earlier 6 . According to their results, workers have a higher probability to retire at the age of 60 and 65 if they experienced an unemployment period during their career.
Colin and Mette (2003) focus their research on the impact of career setbacks on pension amounts for workers from the private sector by taking into account the 1993 French reform.
They observed that both the break in the working career and the duration of working life have an impact on pension benefits. However, the evolution of the legislation shows that different generations are not submitted to the same treatment. Cohorts fully concerned by the reform of 1993 benefit from a lower replacement rate. Workers experiencing a setback such as unemployment, part-time employment or inactivity often receive a lower replacement rate.
This impact can be considerable in terms of pension amounts.
In our article, we follow the same methodology used by Colin and Mette. Nevertheless, we evaluate the impact of career breaks on retirement pensions in the French case by taking into account the last pension reforms rules (2003) and more career breaks cases. Before evaluating the impact of career interruptions, we have to build the career path.
Methodology of career reconstruction and Career Path Analysis
Methodology 8 Data from the Échantillon Interrégimes des Retraités (EIR), a panel which gives information about a retiree's pension in all pension schemes (private -régime general -public pension schemes and complementary schemes). 9 Annual wage returns data given by firms (DADS). 10 For each cohort, an analysis of the individuals' careers was performed, starting with their initial occupation and followed by a decomposition of their different occupational movements. Tables 1 and 2 The results indicate that career setbacks are becoming more frequent, particularly for people born after 1944; this is the case for women as much as for men.
Career Path Analysis
As time passes by, men experiencing careers without setbacks before the age of 55 are rarer (table 1) 
Impact of career accidents on pensions
In this part, we propose to assess the impact of fluctuations around the standard career path on the pension amount and the replacement rate, which is the simplest and most used indicator of the link between pensions and wages. To do that, we use the sample cases method (Box 2)
and define sample cases of a private sector worker's career path which deviates from a fulltime continuous career because of unemployment, part-time work or inactivity.
We limit our study to people who receive a basic pension from only the old age fund of the French Social Security, called CNAV (Caisse nationale d'assurance vieillesse). However, we assess the total amount of the pension determined at retirement, which includes the complementary pensions of ARRCO and AGIRC (only white collar workers).
Box 2: The sample cases method "Sample cases" or "typical cases" are often used for the assessment of public policies. They refer to units like individuals or households, whose characteristics are entirely specified for the study carried out. With regard to existing situations, which would be extracted from a population, sample cases have the advantage of being simple and not being soiled by disruptive singular attributes. from a whole population (Briard, 2007) .
If the goal of the sample cases is simply to illustrate the consequences of the pension's calculation rules, the sample cases can be fictitious, only illustrative, without a narrow link to the characteristics of the population. The stylised sample cases used in this paper, partly built on statistics, can be assigned to an intermediate approach, between representative and conventional cases.
Definitions and sample cases
The reference case that we consider is the path of a childless individual who begins to work at the age of 20 and stops at 60 after a continuous career without breaks or reduced activity periods. It corresponds to the norm on which the calculation of the pension paid by the Social security plan is based (see Box 3). -five years of early retirement, which can be assimilated to five years of unemployment at the end of the active life;
-an inactivity period between 35 and 39 years to raise two children, associated to "old age insurance for parents living at home" (OIPH, see Box 3);
-an inactivity period between 35 and 39 years to rise two children, but not associated to OIPH.
Except these last two sample cases supposed to be those of women with two children, cases indifferently characterize a childless woman or a man.
Our analysis also takes into account professional paths with both unemployment and inactivity. We specify three durations for the unemployment spells, 1 year, 3 years and 5 years, and two durations of inactivity, 3 years and 5 years. The place of these events on the career is the following: The professional paths with five years of inactivity are supposed to be followed by women with two children.
Three earnings profiles are considered:
-the flat profile of a blue collar worker 1.2 times the Guaranteed Minimum Wage (GMW);
-the growing profile of a blue collar worker which starts at 0.5 times the SS wageceiling (SSWC) 13 and finishes at 1 SSWC after 40 years of activity;
-the growing profile of a white collar worker (with contribution to AGIRC) which starts at 1 SSWC and finishes at 2 SSWC.
To simplify, we assume that the earnings progress is linear and not concave as it is generally observed. Besides, only the path with inactivity leads to a temporary stop of the wages progress. In the other cases, after the interruption of activity, the wage is the same as in the absence of interruption. For the projection, the GMW and the social security wage ceiling are supposed to grow at an annual rhythm of 1.7% until 2010 and 1.8% beyond (except inflation).
The rate of payroll contributions is constant in the projections. The retirement age is supposed to remain at 65, so that the pensions are always computed at the full rate, without penalties.
Box 3: Calculation of the Social security pension Social security pensions are managed by the French national old age insurance fund.
In 2008, the pension was calculated in reference to a continuous forty-year career path paid at the level of 800 hours of Guaranteed Minimum Wage (GMW) per year. Thus, a quarter of insurance is validated for every slice of annual wage at 200 hours of GMW (1,772 € on 13 The Social security ceiling is the maximal wage submitted to contribution for the basic pension scheme. It is indexed on wages' growth. On January 1st, 2010, the annual ceiling was 34,620€. At retirement, the basic amount of the pension benefit B is calculated as: The complete and full pension is a reference, but is not an average. It rather constitutes an eligible maximum because an insured individual whose career path is longer cannot expect a higher pension or an earlier retirement, except if he benefits from two conditions introduced in 2003: -a "surcote", which increases the pension of a rate up to 5% on the condition of pursuing a salaried activity after 60 and being eligible for the full rate; -an early retirement, starting at age 56 for the insured having long careers (with conditions of total insurance period, contribution duration and age of the beginning of activity).
Consequently, among the main differences with regard to the continuous career path, we can mention: the losses of rights due to periods of interrupted or reduced activity, and early retirements before eligibility for the full rate with an insufficient contribution duration. In the complementary plans ARRCO and AGIRC, the unemployment periods allow the granting of points on the basis of the last wages: the daily wage determines the amount of unemployment allowances for ARRCO, and the three last years define allowances for AGIRC.
Consequently, periods of unemployment are quite well compensated by basic and complementary plans. However, the pension of an insured person having known unemployment periods could be lower than if he had followed a continuous career path if:
-more than one year of unemployment isn't compensated by the unemployment fund;
-the number of days of the unemployment period was lower than 50 in a calendar year;
-wages earned during the years where he was unemployed are included in the annual average wage (AAW); this is often the case if the working life is shorter than 25 years.
Inactivity periods
CNAV gives place to compensation of inactivity periods only in the case of parental leave: a rise of the insurance period is granted to men and women, but they can't cumulate it with the insurance period bonus of eight quarters per child, which is automatically granted to women 14 . Low-income and children's age conditions (one child under 3 years of age or three children under 21), reduced activity or inactivity periods can also give the right to the pension of the "old age insurance for parents living at home" (OIPH), which consists in granting wages (based on GMW) and quarters.
These familial rights are granted without the obligation of stopping activity, and they are cumulative.
For ARRCO and AGIRC, periods of inactivity give points during parental leave if contributions are paid (with the agreement of the employer), but there is no OIPH. In general, there is no compensation for the interruption of working life due to the children's education, but a pension bonus is given to parents of three or more children.
Part-time and low wages
For the CNAV, only the highest wages count for the calculation of the AAW. 
Results and analysis
At retirement, former employees of the private sector receive at least two pensions from the statutory plans: the pension benefit of the Social security, which is a function of the insurance period and the best wages, and the pension of the complementary plans, ARRCO and AGIRC for white collar workers, which are proportional to contributions. Yet, each of these schemes includes some compensation mechanisms so that an "accident" in the career path is generally smoothened.
Impact on the Social security pension paid by CNAV
For the sample cases considered for the 1940-generation, part-time employment, unemployment and inactivity, associated or not with the OIPH, induce a variation up to 12% on the CNAV pension amount (Table 3 and Annex 1).
The impact of an accident on the insurance period is limited by various mechanisms included in the legislation (see. Box 4). The insurance period is of 160 quarters for the sample case with part-time employment because the annual wage is supposed to be always higher than 800 hours of GMW. For the case with unemployment periods, wages earned during years without unemployment are sufficient to validate four quarters a year too; moreover, the years for which the unemployment period lasts all year are completely compensated with the validation of four assimilated periods (AP). We observe the same result for the cases with an early retirement or an inactivity period associated to OIPH. The only cases in which the insurance period is less than that of the continuous career are the sample cases with inactivity and no OIPH. Of course, losses in the insurance period are less when a bonus is granted for children (16 quarters for two children). For example, the insurance period of the case with 5 years of unemployment and 3 years of inactivity is only 148 quarters, while it is 156 for the case of 5 years of unemployment and 5 years of inactivity with two children (Annex 1b).
Whatever the sample case, the wages are superior or equal to 1.2 GMW so that the pension is not raised at the contributory minimum and the annual average wage (AAW) is effectively taken into account for the calculation of the pension. As a consequence, the incidence of a not-salaried period is variable according its timing in the career and the wages profile: if it concerns a period of weak (respectively high) earnings, AAW -and consequently the pension benefit-will be higher (respectively lesser) than for a continuous career path. Thus, a period of unemployment generally affects AAW and pension benefits less than an early retirement period, which is situated at the end of active life. For the sample cases studied, early retirement causes a decline reaching about 13% for a career path with wages growing from 0.5 to 1 SSWC, 6% for a flat profile with wages at 1.2 GMW and 5% for wages going up to the ceiling (cf. table 3a), while these values are always less in case of an unemployment period with the same duration: respectively -2.1%, -1.0% and -0.4%.
Besides, in case of an accident (part-time, unemployment or inactivity), the selection of the highest wages limits the decline of the AAW and, as a consequence, the pension. For example, for a career paid 1.2 GMW, the period of part-time employment induces a loss of 18.5% of the career average wage for the 1940-generation, but AAW being calculated on only the best wages (the 17 highest ones), its decline remains weak (in most cases 0.4%; cf . table 3 and Annex 1a). The "shock absorber" role of the calculation rule of the AAW is also particularly visible on the case mixing unemployment and inactivity breaks (Table 3b and Annex 1b). In particular, when we consider ten years without wages, that is one quarter of the total career duration, the AAW only declines 0.4% in the sample case with the higher wages (1 to 2 SSW) when the career average wage declines about 4%.
For the more recent generations, the increasing number of wages included in the AAW (enacted in 1993) leads to a decline of the ratio AAW / career average wage (Table 4) . This weakens the "shock absorber" mechanism, particularly for the increasing proportion of people for whom the working life is shorter than the number of wages considered in AAW. The risk of a decrease in pensions is strengthened by the gradual increase in the insurance period required to benefit from a full pension (enacted by the 1993 and 2003 reforms) and to have a complete pension (2003 reform). As a consequence, the standard career of forty years becomes incomplete and does not represent the norm anymore. The relative losses due to a deviation from the new standard career could also increase.
Impact on the total amount of the pension
The complementary plans are often qualified as more contributive than the basic plan because they do not include implicit redistributive mechanisms such as the AAW calculation rules.
Neverthess, they compensate some accidents like unemployment periods to a wider extent by granting as many points as the wage was maintained, while the basic plan validates quarters but does not record wages, which can have a negative impact on the annual average wage.
Evidence of redistributive mechanisms in the pension calculation rules, specifically in the basic pension, is given by decreasing replacement rates: the higher the wages during the working life, the stronger the erosion in purchasing power at retirement. In the sample cases under consideration, redistribution essentially plays between the low or the average level of earnings (1.2 GMW or 0.5 to 1 SSCW) and the high level of earnings (1 to 2 SSCW), regardless of the replacement rates computed on the last wage (see Figure 1 ) or on the average wage (see Table 3 and Annex 1).
The total effect of a deviation from the standard career path on the total amount of pension depends on the nature of the deviation.
The differences in wages -due to part-time employment, for example-are not smoothened in the complementary pensions. As expected, with regard to other accidents, the insured who have part-time employment periods are those who lose most in terms of complementary pension, and the higher their wages, the higher their losses: the loss reaches 12.4% for the career at 1.2 GMW, 13.1% for the career growing from 0.5 to 1 SSWC, and of 19.3 % for the career growing from 1 to 2 SSWC, with a 30% loss on the only pension served by the AGIRC.
On the contrary, in the case of unemployment, the complementary plans can better compensate the loss in pension. It appears that the loss in complementary pensions is less in the case of early retirement -assimilated to unemployment for the pension entitlements-than in the case of unemployment earlier in the career. With regard to a continuous career, the loss of total pension in the case of early retirement is less important than on only the basic plan (2.5% versus 5.9% for a career at 1.2 GMW, for example; see Table 3 ). On the other hand, the compensation of unemployment at younger ages by the complementary plans is not sufficient to compensate for the negative consequences of the accident on the total pension (1.9% versus 1.0% for a career in 1.2 GMW).
In no case do complementary plans compensate inactivity. Thus, the complementary pension of an insured having interrupted his activity is always lower than the pension of an insured with a continuous career. Nevertheless, for the sample cases considered in which inactivity is connected to the education of children, the familial rights entitled by the basic scheme, which can "overcompensate" this kind of interruption, perform quite well for the complete compensation of blue collar workers and reduce the decline of the pension for the white collar workers. In particular, the familial rights can help to access to the « surcote », i.e. a bonus of the pension for each quarter validated by contribution after the full-rate age, from 60.
Consequently, a woman with 160 quarters at 60 (got by 31 years of work, 5 years of OIPH, plus 4 years for two children) who works during four years from 60 to 63, can get a bonus of 12% on her basic pension if the bonus rate is of 3% per annum 15 .
Conclusion
This article provides a measure of the impact of several career breaks on the pension retirement taking into account the last French pension reform (2003) . The statutory pension schemes of the private sector employees include mechanisms to compensate career setbacks.
However, the mechanisms could be estimated insufficient in the extent that the insured are not guaranteed to perceive the amounts they would have earned if they had continued to work.
In the theoretical cases studied and under the assumptions relative to these cases, a break in career could appear to be an advantage for the insured, who may perceive the same -even a higher-pension than he would with a continuous career. Nevertheless, the situation for which the pensioner receives a higher pension amount when the career is interrupted is only observed in the specific case of inactivity for children's education. This overcompensation is not necessarily inefficient, as it not only compensates for the direct consequences of the accident, but also the long run repercussions on the career. It's notably the case with childbirth because mothers obliged to temporally interrupt their activities can have difficulties recovering the same level of wages, or a similar growth in wages, when they are back on the labour market.
Besides, we have to keep in mind these evaluations are carried out on specific cases. Most of the career accidents lasted entire years -except for the case with unemployment spread over the career path. This has a relatively low impact on the annual average wage because in counterpart, the years with wages included in the pension are not amputated.
Among the various measures authorities could take to correct the negative consequences of career setbacks on pension, one measure could be to record the wages which would have been perceived without the career break. An easier to implement and less expansive measure would be to consider the allowances perceived during the career break, as it is currently contemplated for maternity leave. However, this solution would not systematically give a higher pension in the extent that no wage can be less penalizing on the annual average wage than a low wage (including allowances) for persons who have fully worked during less than 25 years. If we lay cost issues aside, these kinds of measures could be considered for career setbacks such as unemployment or illness where the allowances are linked to contributions. In return, even if it's also technically possible that in a similar way the social income given to inactive people provide pension rights, that would raise questions about the grounds and the goals of the pension system. Finally, if we search to minimize the impact of career setbacks on retirees' revenues, the analysis scope has to be broadened in order to envision other calculation rules and to consider the social protection system as a whole. SSWC: Social security wage ceiling, * Gross replacement rate of the career average wage (deviation in points of percentage) ** Case with a labor withdrawal at 56, then a re-entry from 60 to 63. The insurance period is unchanged, but the insured is eligible to a bonus of her basic pension. For the 1940-generation, the case has an illustrative role, because the "surcote" was set up in 2004 and only the quarters got from this date are taken into account. Moreover, here we suppose the delay of the working period from 56-59 to 60-63 has no impact on the pension without bonus (actualization coefficients of wages and points prices are the same). (7,808 / 11,885 
